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NOTE

Russian Roulette: The Magnitsky Act’s
Implications for U.S.-Russian Relations in an
Increasingly Precarious Legislative Game
HILLARY EVANS†
INTRODUCTION
On December 28, 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed
the controversial Dima Yakovlev bill1 into law, which the Duma had
passed one week earlier.2 Formally entitled the “Federal Law On
Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and
Freedoms of the Citizens of the Russian Federation,” U.S. officials
widely condemned the law for its banning of American adoptions of
Russian children as well as halting those adoptions already in
progress.3 However, the adoption bill was only part of a broader
scheme of several measures directed against the United States, which
† J.D., 2014, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law;
Executive Notes Editor, 2013-2014, Maryland Journal of International Law; B.A.,
2011, Vanderbilt University. The author wishes to thank the following people for
their help during the two-year process of drafting this Note: Professor Michael Van
Alstine for his thoughtful feedback and insightful guidance; her fellow editors for
their invaluable comments; Drake Thompson for his pep talks and patience; and, as
always, her parents, Bill and Bonnie Evans, for their unconditional love and
support.
1. See generally “Dima Yakovlev’ Bill in No One’s Best Interests, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/dima-yakovlevbill-no-one-s-best-interests-2012-12-20-0 (discussing the bill and its potential
impact); Jim Heintz, Russia: Vladimir Putin Signs Bill Banning Americans from
Adopting Russian Children, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2012, 12:19 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/28/russia-vladimir-putin-adoptionsbill_n_2374291.html.
2. A Law on Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms of Russian Citizens Has Been Signed, PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE OFFICE
(Dec. 28, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4810.
3. Gregory L. White, Putin Signs Adoption Ban, Putting Pending Cases in
Limbo, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2012, at A8.
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hint at a more political motivation for its creation. In fact, along with
prohibiting American adoptions of Russian children, the bill that
Putin signed on December 28, 2012 also prohibits “those [U.S.
citizens] guilty of violating the fundamental human rights and
freedoms of Russian citizens” from entering Russia, permits Russia
to freeze their assets (financial or otherwise), and prohibits them from
engaging in business transactions and owning property in Russia.4
The bill does not only target private citizens; it also suspends “the
activities of non-profit organizations that receive cash and other
assets from American citizens (organizations), and are involved in
political activities in Russia” and non-profit organizations
“implementing projects, programmes, or conducting other activities
in Russia that act as a threat to Russian interests.”5 Furthermore, the
bill prohibits Russian citizens who are also U.S. nationals from being
the leaders of “non-profit organization, or members or leaders of
branches of international or foreign non-profit organizations involved
in political activities in Russia.”6
This language is essentially a tit-for-tat reaction to the United
States’ Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei
Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, more commonly
known as the Magnitsky Act.7 The Magnitsky Act is a follow-up to
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment,8 and is no less controversial or
contentious than its predecessor, which was originally developed at
the height of the Cold War to prohibit the granting of “most-favorednation” (MFN) status to countries that restricted emigration.9 In fact,
both laws have managed to infuriate the Russian government in
similar ways.10 Essentially, part of the Magnitsky Act requires the
4. PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE OFFICE, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of
Law Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-208, 126 Stat. 1496; White,
supra note 3 at A8.
8. 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1974). For an explanation of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment, see infra Part II.A.
9. Robert H. Brumley, Jackson-Vanik: Hard Facts, Bad Law?, 8 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 363, 363 (1990).
10. The Soviet Union furiously renounced the Amendment shortly after
passage and viewed it as a flagrant interference in its domestic affairs, refusing to
sign the 1972 trade agreement with the United States. Taunya L. McLarty, MFN
Relations with Communist Countries: Is the Two-Decade Old System Working, or
Should It Be Revised or Repealed?, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 153, 172 (1999); Keith
Loken, Why Jackson-Vanik Should Be Abandoned, 16 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J.
3, 6 (2007). Similarly, President Putin made it clear how he felt about the
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President to submit to Congress a list of those who participated in the
Magnitsky case or other human rights abuses.11 Those placed on the
President’s list will be ineligible to receive a visa or will have their
current visa revoked, as well as have their financial assets frozen.12
As a result, the passing and signing of the Magnitsky Act by the
U.S. government involves a broader range of implications than just
soured Russo-American political relations. In this comment I will
consider and analyze various implications resulting from the passage
of the Magnitsky Act, including lessons learned from the JacksonVanik Amendment; how this Act fits within the context of the rules
of the World Trade Organization (WTO); and separation of powers
concerns, specifically the ability of Congress to direct foreign affairs.
To conclude I will discuss whether, in light of all the aforementioned
implications, the Magnitsky Act will be more beneficial or
detrimental as a rule of law.
I.

BACKGROUND OF MAGNITSKY ACT

A brief overview of the background of the Magnitsky Act
provides substantial insight as to why the Russian government would
prefer it did not exist. Sergei Magnitsky was a Russian legal adviser
to the foreign investment firm Hermitage Capital Management
(HCM), who died at the age of 37 while in Russian police custody on
November 16, 2009.13

Magnitsky Act: by issuing an Executive Order directed towards the United States
instructing Russia’s Foreign Ministry to “pursue . . . policy . . . based on the
principles of equality, non-interference in internal affairs . . . [and] to work
actively on preventing unilateral extraterritorial sanctions by the U.S. against
Russian legal entities and individuals,” and by declaring the Magnitsky Act as
“unfriendly . . . towards the Russian Federation.” PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA,
EXECUTIVE ORDER ON MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT FOREIGN POLICY (May 7, 2012,
6:20 PM), http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/3764; News Conference of Vladimir Putin,
PRESIDENTIAL
EXECUTIVE
OFFICE
(Dec.
20,
2012,
4:40
PM),
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4779#sel=
33:1,33:10;34:40,34:60.
11. § 404, 126 Stat. at 1505.
12. Id. at §405.
13. Special Rapporteur on Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Human Rights
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/30/Add.1 (May 19, 2011) (by Gabriela Knaul)
[hereinafter Rep. of Special Rapporteur].
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HCM was the largest foreign investor in the Russian stock
market and its Hermitage Fund was rumored to be the “world’s
leading public equity fund focusing on the Russian market.”14 The
company and its leadership were also known for their whistleblowing
in regard to corruption in Russia.15 In 2007, Russia’s Ministry of
Internal Affairs (MVD) raided HCM’s Moscow office and the offices
of its attorneys.16 HCM applied to the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York for assistance in conducting
discovery for use in a foreign proceeding.17 In its declaration, HCM
alleged that after investigation it had discovered several high-ranking
Russian officials, businessmen, and private individuals comprising
what it called a “criminal enterprise” that organized and perpetrated
the raid on HCM.18 Among others, the declaration named as criminal
senior officers within the MVD, including a Lieutenant Colonel and a
Major; senior officers in the Federal Security Service (the successor
to the KGB); senior officers in various Tax Bureaus; and several
judges, including those of the St. Petersburg Arbitration Court.19
Among businessmen, the declaration named senior executives of
Russian commercial banks as well as its shareholders and directors.20
A potential unspoken and risky implication in this declaration was
that President Putin, who was President at the time, knew of or was
potentially involved in this raid.
HCM alleged that during the raid, MVD officers seized
corporate records from both its Moscow office and the office of its

14. Julia Lapitskaya, Note, ECHR, Russia, and Chechnya: Two Is Not
Company and Three Is Definitely A Crowd, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 479, 516
(2011); Konstantinos D. Magliveras, The Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability
Act: An Extraterritorial Instrument With a Good Cause? 29 No. 3 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 68, 68 (2013).
15. Clifford J. Levy, An Investment Gets Trapped in Kremlin’s Vise, N.Y.
TIMES
(July
24,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/24/world/europe/24kremlin.html
?hp=&pagewanted=all&_r=0.
16. Id.; Thomas Firestone, Criminal Corporate Raiding in Russia, 42 INT'L
LAW. 1207, 1213 (2008).
17. Decl. of Neil Micklethwaite ¶¶ 3–4, 16–18, In re Application of Hermitage
Capital Management Limited for Judicial Assistance to Conduct Discovery for Use
in a Foreign Proceeding, No. M19-116 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. 2009), available at
http://www.robertamsterdam.com/Hermitage%20Micklethwaite%20Declaration.pd
f [hereinafter Decl. of Neil Micklethwaite].
18. Id.
19. Id. ¶ 6.
20. Id.
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law firm.21 HCM stated that the “criminal enterprise” then used to
fraudulently re-register three of the Hermitage Fund’s investment
companies from HSBC Private Bank, the original trustee of the
Hermitage Fund, to certain members of its group.22 The effect of this
re-registering was essentially to replace the HSBC executive directors
with members of the “criminal enterprise,” each of whom had prior
criminal convictions.23
HCM then alleged that the “criminal enterprise” forged contracts
that created approximately U.S. $1 billion worth of false financial
liabilities against the company.24 These counterfeit contracts, dating
from before the raid, would have been impossible to create without
the sensitive documents seized by the MVD, yet were recognized by
multiple judgments handed down by Russian courts.25 That same
year, HCM, under its new, fraudulent directors, applied to tax
authorities for a $230 million refund in overpaid taxes from the
Russian government.26 The refund request was granted immediately
and the government routed money through banks and to bank
accounts that were affiliated with members of the alleged “criminal
enterprise.”27 According to the HCM’s declaration,
The fraudulent rebate of U.S. $230 million was
authorized by Russian tax officials despite the fact that
HSBC and Hermitage had filed comprehensive
criminal complaints with Russian law enforcement
authorities alerting them to the misappropriation of the
Hermitage Companies, fabrication of fictitious
liabilities against them, and the sham court judgments
three weeks before the fraudulent tax refund request . .
. .28

21. Id. ¶ 7.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. ¶ 8.
25. Id. ¶ 8.
26. Lapitskaya, supra note 14, at 516.
27. Decl. of Neil Micklethwaite, supra note 17, ¶ 9.
28. Id. ¶ 10.
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Soon thereafter, petitions were filed in Russian courts to
“liquidate and bankrupt” HCM and its companies.29
HCM’s executives and lawyers were not left untouched during
this time period. Many of them, including HMC’s CEO William
Browder, were intimidated in the form of criminal charges.30
Browder, whose visa was cancelled in 2005, was declared a “threat to
national security” by the Russian government and investigated for tax
evasion.31 However, because he had stayed out of Russia since his

29. Id. ¶ 11. What happened after these petitions were filed is more complex.
In the words of HMC’s CEO William Browder,
“After committing the tax rebate fraud, the criminal group then attempted
to destroy the evidence by liquidating our stolen companies. They first
sold the stolen companies to a British Virgin Islands company called Boily
Systems, and then Boily applied to liquidate our stolen companies. Once
we discovered the transfer to Boily, our lawyers wrote to Commonwealth
Trust Company, the company-formation agent in the British Virgin
Islands, to determine who stood behind Boily and what was going on.
Unfortunately, Commonwealth Trust stonewalled us at every step of the
way. . . . As we later learned, some of the $230 million found its way back
to a Russian individual named Vladlen Stepanov, the ex-husband of the
Russian tax official who authorized the illegal tax refund in 2007. In 2010,
we found out that two companies that were owned by Stepanov received
approximately €8 million into accounts at Credit Suisse Private Bank
Zürich. It turns out that one of those companies was set up by
Commonwealth Trust, and we also learned that Commonwealth Trust
offered a written declaration to Credit Suisse that the company wasn’t
involved in money laundering. . . . In terms of tracing the money, we have
been able to trace $135 million out of the $230 million to eight different
jurisdictions, and have written to the police and prosecutors in those
countries. There are now six different countries that have criminal
investigations opened into the money laundering: Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, Cyprus, Switzerland and Moldova.”
Mary Campbell, Q&A: Hermitage Capital Management Founder Takes on
Russia’s Putin, FINALTERNATIVES (May 29, 2013, 12:52 PM),
http://www.finalternatives.com//node/23784?time=1379609401
(emphasis
omitted).
30. Decl. of Neil Micklethwaite, supra note 17, ¶ 12.
31. Id. ¶ 25. Putin claims to not know Browder exists or the reasons for his
exile, stating:
“I don’t know who this Mr. Browder is, as you say, why he cannot return
to Russia . . . . Russia is a big country . . . . There might have been some
kind of conflicts—conflicts with the authorities, conflicts in the business
world, interpersonal conflicts. But that’s life, it’s complicated and varied.
If a person thinks that his rights have been violated, let him go to court.
We have a legal system that works, thank God.”
Levy, supra note 15.
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visa was revoked, Browder managed to avoid official charges.32
Sergei Magnitsky was not so fortunate.
In 2008, Magnitsky voluntarily testified in court against officials
of the Russian Interior Ministry, accusing the officials of obtaining a
fraudulent rebate of $230 million.33 One month later, on November
24, 2008, Magnitsky was charged with tax evasion and arrested in
Moscow.34 He was refused bail and a court date and was held in pretrial detention for eleven months.35 Although his lawyers filed
complaints on his behalf for the arbitrary nature of his detention
throughout this time period, their applications were all rejected.36 At
some point during his detention, Magnitsky developed gallstones and
acute pancreatitis, and he asserted that he was repeatedly denied
medical treatment for these conditions.37 He also alleged harsh
conditions inside the prison such as poor sanitation, social isolation,
and lack of proper opportunities for defense by writing his complaints
in a journal that was passed out by his lawyers every month.38 On
November 16, 2009, eight guards allegedly beat Magnitsky with
rubber batons, and denied him medical treatment for one hour and
eighteen minutes until he was dead.39 Magnitsky died from heart
failure less than a year after he was arrested.40 A request for an
32. Henry Meyer, Russia to Charge Browder with Tax Evasion, May Seek
Extradition,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS
(May
16,
2011,
7:14
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-16/russia-to-charge-william-browderwith-tax-evasion-might-seek-extradition.html.
33. Rep. of Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, ¶ 1013, at 168.
34. Id. ¶ 1014, at 168.
35. Id.; Decl. of Neil Micklethwaite, supra note 17, ¶ 13, at 7.
36. Rep. of Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, ¶ 1014, at 168.
37. Id. ¶ 1014–15.
38. William Browder, Tortured to Death by Putin’s Jackboot State: Inside the
Rat-infested Gestapo-like Russian Prison Where Eight Guards Beat Lawyer Who
Exposed Moscow’s Gangster Regime, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 11, 2012, 5:00 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2227309/Tortured-death-Putins-jackbootstate-Last-words-Moscow-lawyer-death-screams--chilling-truth-Russias-terrifyinggangster-regime.html#axzz2KMB249Jz; see generally English Translation of
Complaint by Sergey Magnitsky to General Prosecutor Yuru Chaika,
http://russian-untouchables.com/docs/Prison-Diaries-Magnitsky-GeneralProsecutor-Complaint.pdf (English translation of Magnitsky’s complaint provided
by his supporters).
39. Rep. of Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, ¶ 1015, at 168.
40. Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of
Law Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-208, § 402(a)(8), 126 Stat. 1496,
1503.
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independent autopsy was denied, and Magnitsky’s body was only
released to the family on the condition that it be buried
immediately.41
There was a substantial and immediate public outcry after
Magnitsky’s death. The Public Oversight Commission for Human
Rights Observance in Moscow Detention Centers (POC) issued a
report in December 2009 concluding that Russia wrongfully deprived
Magnitsky of his right to life.42 Shortly after, President Medvedev
declared that there would be a criminal investigation into
Magnitsky’s death, and in July 2011, Medvedev’s Human Rights
Council announced the results of its investigation.43 The Council
found that Magnitsky’s “arrest and detention was illegal” among
other things.44 At the time this paper was written, no criminal
convictions have been made in connection to the death “despite the
fact that the POC report concluded that a number of investigators and
penitentiary officials, including the lead investigator in the criminal
case against Mr. Magnitsky, should have been investigated as well.”45
The United Nations has also issued several reports through its
Commission on Torture and its Special Rapporteurs condemning

41. Rep. of Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, ¶ 1015, at 168.
42. The Pub. Oversight Comm’n for Human Rights Observance in Moscow
Det. Centers, Review of the Conditions of the Detention of Sergei Magnitsky in the
Pre-Trial Detention Centers of the City of Moscow, WALL ST. J. at 19,
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-20091229MagnitskyReport.pdf.
43. § 402(a)(8), 126 Stat. at 1503.
44. Id.
45. Comm. against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic
Rep. of the Russian Fed’n, Adopted by the Comm. at its Forty-Ninth Sess. (29
October-23 November 2012), ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/RUS/CO/5 (Dec. 11, 2012)
[hereinafter Concluding Observations]. Although there were originally charges
against the head doctor at the prison, Larisa Litivnova, those charges have since
been dropped. § 402(a)(8), 126 Stat. at 1503. Curiously enough, Russia
posthumously retried Magnitsky and his co-defendant Browder for tax evasion, a
stunt hearkening back to the Stalinist era of in absentia trials. David M.
Herszenhorn, Dead Lawyer, a Kremlin Critic, Is Found Guilty of Tax Evasion,
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 12, 2013, at A4. Although officials claimed the trial was to help
Magnitsky’s supporters clear his name, relatives say they did not ask for a retrial,
and many predicted that the trial would serve to vindicate those Magnitsky and
Browder accused of corruption. Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Plans to Retry Dead
Lawyer in Tax Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012, at A4. They were right. On July 11,
2013, Sergei Magnitsky was found guilty of tax evasion, almost four years after his
death. Herszenhorn, supra note 45. Browder was sentenced to nine years in prison.
Id.
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Magnitsky’s death and calling for stricter investigations and
adherence to international treaties and norms.46
Individual countries have also taken action against Russia and
those involved in Magnitsky’s death.47 Several parliaments including
those in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Poland,
have passed resolutions “urging their governments to introduce
sanctions on the Magnitsky case,” while other parliaments such as
those in Portugal, France, Spain, and Latvia, are drafting similar
resolutions.48 In response to these resolutions of EU member states,
in October 2012 the European Parliament adopted recommendations
to the European Council to establish “a common EU list of officials
responsible for the death of Sergei Magnitsky,” to ban these officials
from the EU, and to freeze financial assets “they or their family may
hold” in the EU.49
These recommendations are echoed in the text of United States’
Magnitsky Act. This Act, introduced in the House of Representative
by Representative Dave Camp in July 2012, became Public Law 112208 when signed by President Obama on December 14, 2012.50 The
purpose of the Act is “[t]o authorize the extension of
nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations treatment) to
products of the Russian Federation . . . and to require reports on the
compliance of the Russian Federation with its obligations as a
member of the World Trade Organization, and for other purposes.”51
The Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei
Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 is divided into
46. Concluding Observations, supra note 45, at 2, ¶ 5; Rep. of Special
Rapporteur, supra note 13, at 167–68.
47. Common Visa Restrictions for Russian Officials Involved in the Sergei
Magnitsky Case, EUR. PARL. DOC. (P7_TA-PROV 0369) 79–81 (2012).
48. Id. at 80.
49. Id.; Magliveras, supra note 14, at 69. The EU is still considering whether
to pass such a law. Dmitry Zhdannikov & Darya Korsunskaya, Russian Tycoons
Concerned as Magnitsky Fallout Spreads, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/25/us-davos-russia-magnitskyidUSBRE90O0RA20130125.
50. See supra note 7; H.R. Res. 6156, 112th Cong. (2012) (enacted); Stephen
Collinson, Obama Signs Russia Rights Law Despite Putin Fury, AFP (Dec. 14,
2012), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ifTJR_NiuSC0kkG
DgBkKJjDDYSqQ?docId=CNG.1a7e217111e4906ef1b6b3e54e79e1b0.141.
51. Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of
Law Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-208, 126 Stat. 1496, 1496.
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several titles. Title I of the Act repeals the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment, also known as title IV of the Trade Act of 1975, due to
Russia’s becoming a member of the WTO.52 Title II, section 201
requires reports on Russia from the United States Trade
Representative on how the country is implementing its obligations as
a member of the WTO.53 If the Trade Representative believes Russia
is not honoring its obligations, he is then required to present a report
on the actions he plans to take and those he has taken to “encourage
the Russian Federation to improve its implementation of the
agreement.”54 Section 202 of the Act requires the Trade
Representative and the Secretary of State to submit a report on
measures taken and results achieved during the year preceding the
submission with respect to promoting the rule of law in Russia,
including “strengthening formal protections for United States
investors in the Russian Federation,” and “advocating for United
States investors in the Russian Federation” among other things.55
This section also requires the Secretary of Commerce to set up a
phone line and website to allow United States entities inside and
outside Russia to report instances of bribery and corruption, to submit
reports detailing the number of instances where bribery or corruption
has occurred, and report on actions taken by the Secretary of
Commerce to help those that have reported bribery or corruption.56
Title IV introduces the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law
Accountability Act.57 In Section 402 of this title, Congress lists its
findings in regard to multiple human rights abuses in Russia and
discusses Magnitsky’s case in detail.58 The section then goes on to
explain why Magnitsky’s prosecution was “politically motivated,”
and concludes by claiming that the “Russian Government’s
suppression of dissent and political opposition, the limitations it has
imposed on civil society and independent media, and the
deterioration of economic and political freedom inside Russia are of

52. Id. § 102.
53. Id. § 201.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 202.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 401.
58. Id. § 402. Besides Magnitsky’s case, this section also discusses the
detention of Mikhail Khodorkovsky as well as multiple unsolved murders of
Russian journalists. Id.
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profound concern to the United States Government and the American
people.”59
The Magnitsky Act also includes significant provisions that set
up the potential for foreign affairs conflicts between the President and
Congress. In section 404, Congress requires the President to submit a
list of “persons responsible for the detention, abuse or death of Sergei
Magnitsky, participated in efforts to conceal the legal liability for the
detention, abuse, or death of Sergei Magnitsky, financially benefitted
from the detention, abuse, or death of Sergei Magnitsky, or [were]
involved in the criminal conspiracy uncovered by Sergei Magnitsky”
and well as other violators of human rights.60 Sections 405 and 406
then detail the consequences of being on the President’s list.61 In
section 405, those people that are on the President’s list are ineligible
to receive visas to the United States, and the Secretary of State will
revoke the visas of those that already have them.62 In section 406, the
Act gives the President power under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act to “freeze and prohibit all transactions in all
property and interests in property of a person who is on the list . . . if
such property and interests in property come within the United States
. . . .”63 The Act ends with section 407, which orders the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of the Treasury to submit a report on their
actions taken to carry out Title IV of the Act, and efforts by the
executive branch to encourage the governments of other countries to
impose sanctions on Russia such as those found Title IV.64
On April 12, 2013, the Obama Administration released a list of
18 individuals who would be sanctioned under the Magnitsky Act.65

59. Id.
60. Id. § 404.
61. Id. §§ 405–06.
62. Id. § 405.
63. Id. § 406(a)(1).
64. Id. § 407.
65. Listing Update, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Magnitsky Sanctions Listings
(Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/20130412.aspx. These individuals include: Letscha Bogatirov,
Aleksey Droganov, Kazbek Dukuzov, Pavel Karpov, Yelena Khimina, Dmitriy
Komnov, Aleksey Krivoruchko, Artem Kuznetsov, Oleg Logunov, Andrey
Pechegin, Sergei Podoprigorov, Ivan Prokopenko, Oleg Silchenko, Yelena
Stashina, Olga Stepanova, Dmitri Tolchinskiy, Svetlana Ukhnalyova, and Natalya
Vinogradova. Id.
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Of these 18 people, 16 were involved with the Magnitsky case.66
Although the list contained tax officials and district court judges
among others, noticeably absent from the list were more senior
officials in Putin’s administration who were involved with
Magnitsky’s prosecution.67 U.S. Representative James McGovern
even called the list “timid,” with “more significant omissions than
names.”68 Although members of Congress have called for more
Russians to be added to the list, U.S. officials did state that “the
Obama administration had also chosen to deny visas to other Russian
officials but kept their names in a classified annex,” as allowed by the
Act, perhaps alluding to higher-level officials.69 Unsurprisingly,
Russia retaliated with its own list of 18 Americans banned from the
country, including former President George W. Bush and former
Vice President Dick Cheney.70
After its controversial and sensitive history, it is reasonable to
expect that the Magnitsky Act will have wide-reaching implications
not only on Russian-American relations, but also on foreign policy
between nations.
II. IMPLICATIONS
Although the implications of such a controversial act are
numerous, this paper will only focus on three specific areas
concerning trade and the power of Congress to declare foreign
policy.71 First, Part A will discuss lessons learned from the history of
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and how those lessons have
impacted Russian-American relations as well as Russia’s reception of
66. Richard Solash, U.S. Targets 18 Individuals on ‘Magnitsky List,’ RADIO
FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.rferl.org/content/unitedstates-publishes-magnitsky-list-russia/24956249.html.
67. Jim Heintz, Russia Responds to U.S. Magnitsky Act By Placing 18
Americans
On
Blacklist,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Apr.
13,
2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/13/russia-responds-to-usmag_n_3075795.html
68. Solash, supra note 66.
69. Id.
70. Steve Gutterman, Russian Bans 18 Americans in Retaliation for Magnitsky
List, REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/13/usrussia-usa-rights-idUSBRE93B0PU20130413.
71. There are numerous implications to be discussed within the context of
human rights, the Magnitsky Act, and the impact it will have on international
human rights policies in general. Unfortunately, these implications are so numerous
that they would require their own paper. As a result, the author has purposefully
left out any substantial discussion of human rights implications as they relate to the
Magnitsky Act.
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the Magnitsky Act. Part B will address the relationship between the
Magnitsky Act and the WTO, including the implications of the
United States’ creating legislation that strongly encourages Russia to
honor its international trade obligations. Finally, Part C will discuss
separation of powers concerns with regard to the Magnitsky Act and
more specifically the ability of Congress to direct foreign affairs.
A.

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment

The volatile history of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment has
implications for not only Russia’s reception of the Magnitsky Act,
but also its long-term effectiveness. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment
to Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 was originally included at the
height of the Cold War to prohibit the granting of “most-favorednation” (MFN) status to countries that restrict emigration.72 More
specifically,
[i]f a country denies its citizens the right or
opportunity to emigrate, imposes more than a nominal
tax on emigration or emigration documents, or
imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee, or
other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the
desire of such a citizen to emigrate, then that country
is ineligible under U.S. law for MFN treatment.73
Although in 1972 President Nixon began the process of
negotiating with the Soviet Union on a bilateral trade agreement that
would grant MFN status to the country, negotiations were derailed
shortly after the Soviet Union imposed an exit tax on those trying to
emigrate, costing as much as 40,000 rubles for scientists and their
families.74 The Jewish community in the United States perceived this
as a tax against Soviet Jews and began campaigning against it,
leading several Congress members including Senator Henry Jackson
and Representative Charles Vanik to come up with the idea of linking
trade and emigration together in a policy that would discourage the
Soviet Union from restricting Jewish emigration and encourage the
lifting of such restrictions.75 As a result, the Jackson-Vanik

72. Brumley, supra note 9, at 363.
73. Kevin M. Cowan, Cold War Trade Statutes: Is Jackson-Vanik Still
Relevant?, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 737, 742 (1994).
74. Brumley, supra note 9, at 365.
75. Id.; Cowan, supra note 73, at 742.
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Amendment was born, voted into law, and remained law until
repealed by the Magnitsky Act.
Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union furiously renounced the
Amendment shortly after passage and viewed it as a flagrant
interference in their domestic affairs.76 The most immediate
consequence of Russia’s anger was that it refused to sign the 1972
trade agreement with the United States.77 One potential implication of
this was that the United States had potentially hurt its own economic
interests as a result of the Amendment.78 This belief might have had
some credence—the United States did not sign another
comprehensive trade agreement with Russia until 1990.79
Furthermore, it is unclear as to whether the Amendment actually
ended up promoting Jewish emigration or not.80 Although some
believe that the Amendment provided “key leverage” in persuading
the Soviet Union to loosen its emigration policies, others believe that
several different factors and pressures independent of the
Amendment occurred during this time period, potentially contributing
to an increase in Jewish emigration.81 Either way, by 1990 the
number of Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union had substantially
increased and continued to remain high through the decade.82
The reaction of the Soviet Union to the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment lends insight into why the Russian government
responded so angrily to the Magnitsky Act and how it will continue
to respond in the future. As made clear in the 1970’s, Russia does not
appreciate other countries’ meddling in its foreign affairs. This was
emphasized on May 7, 2012 when President Putin, having just been
inaugurated, issued an Executive Order towards the United States
instructing his Foreign Ministry “to pursue the policy of ensuring a
stable and predictable cooperation based on the principles of equality,
non-interference in internal affairs and respect for mutual interests . .
. [and] to work actively on preventing unilateral extraterritorial
sanctions by the U.S. against Russian legal entities and

76. McLarty, supra note 10, at 172.
77. Keith Loken, Why Jackson-Vanik Should Be Abandoned, 16 CURRENTS:
INT'L TRADE L.J. 3, 6 (2007).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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individuals.”83 Although the Magnitsky Act had not yet been passed,
several versions of it had been introduced to the House, leaving no
doubt as to what Putin meant.84 This sentiment was echoed again in
Putin’s news conference on December 20, 2012, when he pointedly
stated, “This is undoubtedly an unfriendly act towards the Russian
Federation. . . . [T]he issue here has nothing to do with officials. It’s a
matter of one anti-Soviet, anti-Russian law being replaced with
another. . . . [W]e [understand] it as U.S. lawmakers making it clear
to us who’s the boss here, and keeping a certain level of tension. If
Magnitsky did not exist, they’d have found another pretext.”85
Another retaliatory, almost spiteful, measure Russia took was to retry
Sergei Magnitsky and William Browder for tax fraud, posthumously
and in absentia respectively, as if to demonstrate Putin’s contempt for
the U.S. legislation that held those responsible for Magnitsky’s
detention accountable.86 Finally, as stated previously, on December
28, 2012 Putin passed the “Federal Law On Sanctions for Individuals
Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens
of the Russian Federation,” or the Dima Yakovlev bill, imposing a
wide range of sanctions against United States citizens, non-profit
organizations, and even those citizens wishing to adopt a Russian
child.87
Because Russia has responded so negatively to the passing of the
Magnitsky Act, it is plausible that the Act could have the same
immediate implications as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment did in
1974. First, negotiations, agreements, and treaties could be impeded,
if not halted altogether. Certainly there will be a tension involved that
has been created due to the Magnitsky case. This tension has already
manifested in recent and escalating events such as the Edward
83. Executive Order on Measures to Implement Foreign Policy, PRESIDENTIAL
EXECUTIVE OFFICE (May 7, 2012, 6:20 PM), http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/3764.
84. See e.g., Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, H.R.
4405, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/
bdquery/z?d112:HR04405:@@@X|/home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;c=112 (a
version introduced to the House).
85. News Conference of Vladimir Putin, PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE OFFICE
(Dec. 20, 2012, 4:40 PM), http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4779#sel=33:1,33:10
;34:40,34:60.
86. S. Adam Cardais, Ioana Caloianu & Molly Jane Zuckerman, Magnitsky
Convicted of Tax Fraud, Karadzic Genocide Charge Reinstated, DOW JONES
FACTIVA (July 12, 2013), http://www.tol.org/client/article/23861-magnitskyconvicted-of-tax-fraud-karadzic-genocide-charge-reinstated.html.
87. PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE OFFICE, supra note 2.
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Snowden incident,88 the crisis in Syria,89 cancelled bilateral
negotiations between Presidents Obama and Putin,90 and Putin’s oped in the New York Times.91 Because both Obama and Putin have
stated that they intend to work together to seek further reductions in
each country’s respective nuclear weapons, these talks could also
potentially feel the ill effects of resentment resulting from the passage
of the Magnitsky Act.92 As a result, the adversarial, retaliatory nature

88. Alastair Jamieson, Obama Faces Showdown with Putin at G-20 Summit
Over
Syria,
NBC
NEWS
(Sept.
5,
2013,
11:59
AM),
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/09/05/20336921-obama-facesshowdown-with-putin-at-g-20-summit-over-syria?lite. In August 2013, Russian
officials granted temporary asylum to Snowden, who had leaked classified
information from the NSA and consequently fled the United States, in spite of
appeals from the White House requesting Russia return Snowden to the U.S. to face
justice. Id.; Press Briefing, Press Sec’y Jay Carney, The White House (July 12,
2013, 1:10 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/12/pressbriefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-7122013.
89. Jamieson supra note 88. The tension between the United States and Russia,
an ally of the Assad regime, over the escalating Syrian civil war, which has left
over one hundred thousand Syrians dead and over two million refugees, reached a
fever pitch after an August 21, 2013 chemical weapons attack that killed hundreds
of people, including women and children. Id.; Deaths, Refugees, and Damage:
Syria’s
Crisis
in
Figures,
YAHOO
NEWS
(Sept.
4,
2013),
http://news.yahoo.com/deaths-refugees-damage-syrias-crisis-figures161611459.html; Rick Gladstone & Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Leader Admits
Failure to Halt Syrian Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2013, at A13.
90. Jessica Yellin, Jake Topper & Tom Cohen, Obama Cancels Talks with
Putin Ahead of G-20 Summit, CNN (Aug. 8, 2013, 6:38 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/07/politics/obama-putin/index.html. This author also
recently had the opportunity to view a bilateral discussion between a Russian
minister and a United States government agency, post-Snowden. Although the
discussion did not involve the contentious topic of Snowden, there was palpable
tension between countries at points throughout the day.
91. Vladimir Putin, A Plea for Caution from Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
2013, at A31. Putin’s op-ed was met by much criticism from U.S. politicians
(including a rebuttal op-ed by Senator McCain) for its condemnation of American
“exceptionalism.” Thomas Grove, Senator McCain Attacks Putin on Russian
Website, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/19/usrussia-usa-mccain-idUSBRE98I0AB20130919; Jethro Mullen, Vladimir Putin’s
Comments on American Exceptionalism, Syria Cause a Fuss, CNN (Sept. 12,
2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/12/politics/putin-syria-editorial-reaction/
index.html.
92. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Speech (Feb. 12, 2013),
available
at
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/state-of-the-union-2013president-barack-obamas-speech-transcript-text-87550.html.
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of recent legislation and political maneuvers indicate that a return to
Cold War rhetoric and behavior is certainly possible.93
Other lessons from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment indicate that
the future of the Magnitsky Act looks shaky. Due to Putin’s retrial of
Magnitsky instead of trying those responsible for his death as well as
his passage of sanctions against United States citizens, it appears that
any progress hoped for by the United States as well as other
international organizations in regard to justice for the abuse and death
of Magnitsky is unlikely. If the status quo is maintained, the
Magnitsky bill will potentially continue to be a point of tension and
aggravation in U.S.-Russian relations, just as the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment was.94 Before the Amendment was repealed, officials in
Russia “complained that Russia remain[ed] under the shadow of
Jackson-Vanik,” a sentiment that is likely to resurface again
depending on the length of time this Act is in effect.95 If this Act does
not produce the results desired and continues to increase tension
between Russia and the United States, the resentment incurred could
undermine U.S.-Russian relations for years to come, possibly leading
to calls for its repeal.
B.

The Magnitsky Act and the WTO

The Magnitsky Act ultimately repealed the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment, a law that made certain countries’ normal trade relations
(NTR) status conditional, because it was incompatible with Russia’s
recent accession to the WTO.96 Article I of one of the governing
documents of the WTO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), prevents member countries from discriminating against
other member countries, and requires all member states to treat each
other equally, stating,

93. See, e.g., David Francis, Putin Just Took the Iron Curtain Out of
Mothballs, FISCAL TIMES (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/
2013/08/08/Putin-Just-Took-the-Iron-Curtain-Out-of-Mothballs (explaining how
Putin has violently quashed dissent using methods similar to those used in Soviet
Russia).
94. Loken, supra note 77, at 7.
95. Id.
96. Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of
Law Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-208, 126 Stat. 1496; Loken,
supra note 77, at 7.
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With respect to customs duties and charges of any
kind imposed on or in connection with importation or
exportation or imposed on the international transfer of
payments for imports or exports, and with respect to
the method of levying such duties and charges, and
with respect to all rules and formalities in connection
with importation and exportation, and with respect to
all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article
III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties.97
Because Russia became a member of the WTO on August 22,
2012, the United States was expected to extend unconditional
MFN/NTR status to Russia as is required under GATT and the WTO
Agreement.98
The Magnitsky Act makes it clear that one of its main purposes
and a condition of its repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment is to
ensure that Russia complies with its obligations under the WTO. The
first sentence of the Act declares an important purpose to be to
“require reports on the compliance of the Russian Federation with its
obligations as a member of the World Trade Organization.”99 This
language points to important implications in the context of the
relationship between Russia and the United States under the WTO
Agreement.
The first implication is that the Magnitsky Act is designed to set
up a foundation for the United States to make claims against and
potentially challenge Russia in the WTO. By requiring the United
States Trade Representative to submit reports to Congress on the
97. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
98. Accessions: Russian Federation, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2013),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm; Loken, supra note
77, at 7. Although members of the WTO agreed to extend MFN/NTR status to all
other members, if a WTO member decides it cannot comply with this obligation, it
can invoke the non-application provision of the WTO Agreement. H.R. REP. NO.
112-632, pt. 1, at 4 (2012). However, Congress determined that it would be the
most beneficial to the United States economy to extend MFN status to Russia so as
to reap the benefits of Russia’s concessions as a new member state of the WTO. Id.
99. 126 Stat. at 1496.
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extent to which Russia is implementing the WTO Agreement and its
annexed agreements, Congress is ensuring that, should the need arise,
the United States is immediately prepared to file a dispute in the
WTO.100 Furthermore, the Magnitsky Act mandates that if the Trade
Representative finds that Russia is not fully implementing the WTO
agreements, he is to include in the report the actions he plans to take
to encourage Russia to improve its implementation.101 These actions
most likely will include addressing the issue to the WTO in the form
of filing a dispute claim, because the Trade Representative deals with
the WTO on a regular basis. In this way, the Magnitsky Act ensures
that the process of a WTO challenge against Russia is already set in
motion as soon as the Trade Representative files a report. The Trade
Representative must also file a separate report describing the
“enforcement actions” he has taken “to ensure the full compliance of
the Russian Federation with its obligations as a member of the World
Trade Organization.”102 Although this appears similar to the previous
requirement of reporting on his plans to encourage Russia, this part of
the Act conveys a stricter tone, indicating that the Trade
Representative and the United States must take actions to ensure
Russia’s compliance with the WTO. This raises even more questions
as to whether it is the duty of the United States to take it upon itself to
ensure Russia’s compliance with the WTO, outside of filing disputes
with the WTO and solving those disputes within the organization,
and whether it is a violation of any WTO agreement for the United
States to do so.
These questions indicate that the United States, through the
Magnitsky Act, could potentially undermine the dispute settlement
system of the WTO by taking action against Russia if it finds Russia
to be unsuccessfully implementing its obligations as a member of the
WTO. In the Understanding of Rules and Procedures Concerning the
Settlement of Disputes agreement of the WTO, it is stated that “[t]he
dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading
system.”103 Furthermore, “WTO members have agreed that if they
100. Id. § 201.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 402 [hereinafter DSU].
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believe fellow-members are violating trade rules, they will use the
multilateral system of settling disputes instead of taking action
unilaterally.”104 According to Article 23 of that same agreement,
When Members seek redress of a violation of
obligations or other nullification or impairment of
benefits under the covered agreements or an
impediment to the attainment of any objective of the
covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and
abide by, the rules and procedures of this
Understanding. In such cases, Members shall: (a) not
make a determination to the effect that a violation has
occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired
or that the attainment of any objective of the covered
agreements have been impeded, except through
recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the
rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall
make any such determination consistent with the
findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body
report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award
rendered under this Understanding . . . .105
This Article appears to indicate that nations should not take it
upon themselves outside of the dispute settlement system of the WTO
to make any findings as to whether another nation is in compliance
with any WTO agreement, or to ensure that one nation is complying
with the Agreement. The Magnitsky Act explicitly tells the Trade
Representative to make such a finding, present it to Congress, and
then to take actions to ensure compliance based on the assumption
that Russia has been violating its obligations as a member of the
WTO. On its face, this order seems to defy the provisions to solve
WTO disputes multilaterally, not unilaterally, as well as to make
determinations of compliance only in accordance with the dispute
settlement process. Furthermore, this creates the impression that not
only does the United States flout the dispute settlement rules of the
WTO, it also takes on the responsibilities of an international
organization by meddling in the business of other countries at the
expense of violating its own international obligations.

104. WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, 55, (3d ed. 2005).
105. DSU art. 23.
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C. Separation of Powers Concerns
Whenever both the legislative and the executive branch are
involved in creating foreign policy, separations of powers concerns
arise. However, there is not one single source that clearly defines the
doctrine of separation of powers. As such, several sources, such as
the Constitution, scholarly writing, and case law must be read
together in order to effectively discuss how the doctrine operates
within the context of the Magnitsky Act.
1.

Interpreting the Separation of Powers Doctrine

There is no explicit definition of separation of powers within the
Constitution. However, the doctrine was derived from Articles I, II,
and III of the Constitution, which set forth the rights and duties of
Congress, the President, and the Judiciary, respectively. Specifically,
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution states, “All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States….”106 Likewise, Article II, Section 1 states, “The executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America.”107 This language indicates that each branch of government
has its own powers and that these powers shall vest in that particular
branch of government and nowhere else.
In order to clear up some of the confusion as to which
constitutional powers belong to whom, different scholars and judges
have elaborated upon the powers given to the President versus the
powers given to Congress. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
clearly sets out the legislative branch’s power to direct foreign policy,
stating that it has the powers to “regulate Commerce with foreign
nations,” and to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and
Excises,” among other things.108 According to Justice Alito’s
concurrence in Zivotofsky v. Clinton as well as the majority opinion
in Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York, this power to regulate
foreign commerce also includes the right to “regulate the entry of
persons into this country.”109 Essentially, Article I “gives Congress

106. U.S. CONST. art. I, §1.
107. U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 1.
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
109. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1436 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring); Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270–71
(1875).
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almost all the enumerated powers over foreign affairs, and [A]rticle II
gives the President almost none of them.”110
As a result, the powers given to the President by the Constitution
are not as clear-cut as those given to Congress. In fact, “[c]onsidered
only for affirmative grants of power, the president’s Article II
authority would appear to be quite limited.”111 However, although the
presidential powers are not as explicitly defined as the legislative
powers found in Article I, the President still has broad foreign affairs
powers. More specifically, the President has “powers to create
international obligations for the United States in his capacity as the
nation’s ‘constitutional representative’ in foreign affairs.”112 As
American Jurisprudence states, “Foreign policy is the province and
responsibility of the executive, and the conduct of foreign affairs is
exclusively vested in the executive branch although it is also said that
the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States is committed
by the Constitution to the executive and the legislative—the
political—departments of the government.”113 The President has the
undefined power to recognize a foreign government, as well as the
powers to negotiate international agreements, respond to foreign
events as spokesperson, initiate United States policy, represent the
United States at international organizations, waive obligations made
by other countries to the United States, interpret treaties in the first
instance, withdraw the United States from treaties, and authorize the
use of force abroad in pursuit of United States’ interests.114
Despite the limited amount of enumerated presidential powers
found in the Constitution, Presidents have generally had an expansive
view of their foreign affairs powers, and have “aggressively resisted
congressional encroachment on their perceived prerogatives,” which
has been reflected in case law.115 Justice Sutherland illustrated this
view in his opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation, when he quoted John Marshall’s speech to the House of
110. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign
Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1292 (1988).
111. Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs
Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309, 311 (2006).
112. Id. at 316.
113. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 252 (2013).
114. Id.; Richard F. Grimmett, Foreign Policy Roles of the President and
Congress, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (June 1, 1999), http://fpc.state.gov/6172.htm; Jean
Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 VA. L.
REV. 987, 1002 (2013).
115. Galbraith, supra note 114, at 1002.

232

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:210

Representatives: “‘the President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
nations.’”116 Moreover, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer,117 although the Court ultimately decided that President
Truman’s actions exceeded his constitutional authority when he
issued an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to
take possession of and operate most of the country’s steel mills,118 the
concurrences of several justices indicated that a President’s power is
not limited to the powers expressly granted in Article II. As Justice
Jackson stated in his concurrence, “Presidential powers are not fixed
but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with
those of Congress.”119 Ultimately, Justice Jackson’s concurrence had
a profound effect on separation of powers jurisprudence, as
demonstrated in Dames & Moore v. Regan,120 where the Court
explicitly used the concurrence to uphold President Carter’s
executive orders concerning Iran during the Iranian hostage crisis.121
When courts do have to get involved in separation of powers
issues, they tend to defer to past practice in order to make their
decision.122 Youngstown is also important because Justice
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion articulated the importance of
historical practice as a part of interpreting presidential power when he
said, “In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before
questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold
the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the
structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive
Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”123 In this way,
presidential powers have increased over time as reliance on past
practice has validated whatever particular power the President is

116. 299. U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
117. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
118. Id. at 582, 587.
119. Id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
120. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
121. Id. at 668–69.
122. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical
Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM L. REV. 1097, 1098–99 (2013).
123. Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
610–11 (1952)).
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attempting to assert.124 By considering the presence or absence of
past practice in resolving separation of powers disputes, theoretically
either the President or Congress can come out ahead.125 However,
“past practice has furthered gradual accretions of presidential power
because the President, as a unitary actor unhindered by the collective
action challenges that constrain Congress, has both the incentives and
the abilities to push the boundaries repeatedly.”126 As such, the
executive branch tends to come out ahead.
2.

Separation of Powers Concerns Within the Magnitsky Act

Because there is no explicit separation of powers between the
President and Congress, it is unclear how a court would rule should
such a challenge arise from the Magnitsky Act. By analyzing
language within the Magnitsky Act that may implicate the separation
of powers doctrine, I hope to not only identify specific provisions that
could potentially raise separation of powers concerns, but also to
discuss provisions that could result in serious conflict between the
executive and legislative branches. I will first address provisions of
lesser concern that are still worth mentioning, and then I will discuss
a provision of greater concern.
a.

Provisions Of Lesser Concern

The provisions of lesser concern within the Magnitsky Act that
may implicate the separation of powers doctrine deal less with the
President and more with those in his cabinet and the greater executive
branch of government. The first area of concern is where Congress
orders the Trade Representative to issue a report on enforcement
actions he has taken to “ensure the full compliance” of the Russian
Federation to the obligations of the WTO.127 Although Congress does
not directly order a member of President Obama’s cabinet to take
action against Russia, this provision implies that the executive branch
must take some sort of enforcement action if and when Russia does
not abide by the WTO rules. Some might see this provision as
trespassing on the executive branch’s territory by telling it what
124. An illustration of this is the President’s issuance of a constitutional
signing statement when signing a bill into law. Id. at 1107. This could indicate that
the President is attempting “to prevent historical gloss from developing in a way
that might limit presidential authority.” Id. at 1108.
125. Galbraith, supra note 114, at 1004.
126. Id.
127. Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of
Law Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-208, § 201(b), 126 Stat. 1496,
1499.
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foreign policy should be and on what conditions it should be made,
and could raise a separation of powers challenge.
A second area of concern is at the end of the Magnitsky Act,
where Congress orders the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the
Treasury, members of the executive branch, to submit to Congress a
report on “efforts by the executive branch to encourage the
governments of other countries to impose sanctions that are similar to
the sanctions imposed under this title.”128 In a manner similar to the
previous concern, this provision implies that the executive branch
must be making efforts to persuade other countries to impose certain
sanctions, and as a result, some could argue that Congress
overstepped the line by telling the President and the executive branch
how to direct and create foreign policy, thereby disregarding the
principle of separation of powers. Although these instances of
separation of powers concerns may seem small or insignificant, they
are important to mention when discussing the implications of the
ability of Congress to direct foreign affairs through its passage of the
Magnitsky Act.
b.

Section 404(a)

The Magnitsky Act also contains a section implicating
separation of powers issues that are of greater concern; namely the
requirement in §404(a) that the President must exclude certain
Russian people because of the fact that Congress did not like what
happened to Sergei Magnitsky. This section provides in part: “Not
later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
list of each person who the President determines, based on credible
information—(1) is responsible for the detention, abuse, or death of
Sergei Magnitsky. . . .”129 The bolded language indicates that the
creation of such a list is not discretionary—it is a mandatory action
that the President must take, as dictated by Congress. There is no
other option. Although later on in §404(d) the President has the
ability to remove a person from the list “if the President determines
and reports to the appropriate congressional committees . . . that (1)
credible information exists that the person did not engage in the
128. Id. § 407(2).
129. Id. § 404(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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[alleged] activity; (2) the person has been prosecuted appropriately . .
. or (3) the person has credibly demonstrated a significant change in
behavior,” and/or somehow atoned for and renounced such activities,
this does not change the fact that the President must still create a list
of individuals to face mandatory sanctions by the United States, and
cannot remove those individuals from the list except for the reasons
set forth by Congress.130
This provision implicates greater separation of powers concerns
because it has the potential to raise considerable conflict between the
executive and legislative branches. If the provision’s legitimacy were
ever challenged in court, the judicial branch, upon deciding to hear
the case, would have to determine on the merits whether the
Magnitsky Act infringed upon the foreign affairs powers of the
President. As stated previously, because the President has so few
explicit powers, the case is not clear-cut. On one hand, as the Court in
Henderson and the concurrence by Justice Alito in Zivotofsky stated,
Congress’s power to regulate foreign commerce also includes the
right to regulate the entry of people into the United States.131 On the
other hand, the President retains broad foreign affairs powers, and as
pointed out in Curtiss-Wright, the President is “the sole organ of
nation in its external relations.”132 Therefore, the Magnitsky Act
implicates a serious conflict between the two branches of government
in this specific area of foreign affairs, particularly if the President
were to refuse to submit such a list. Should the President claim the
power to create a list of individuals to face mandatory sanctions as
his exclusive power, a legitimate separation of powers claim could
arise; one which would have to be closely scrutinized by the Court.
CONCLUSION
Sergei Magnitsky’s abuse and death while in prison on false
charges were deplorable, and the political nature of the crimes against
him raise a large number of human rights concerns for those who
oppose the Russian government. It is reasonable for countries to
desire to impose some kind of legislation or obtain some measure of
justice to ensure that this does not continue to ocvcur. However, the
Magnitsky Act seeks to impose punitive measures on an area that
Russia considers to be a purely domestic concern. Although Congress
130. Id. § 404(d).
131. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1436 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring); Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270–71
(1875).
132. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299. U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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appears to have the power to pass this law, it does not necessarily
make it an effective law. In some ways it simply replaces the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment and creates the same hostile feelings that
the Russian government felt back in the 1970’s when the Amendment
was first enacted.
At the time of this note’s publication, instead of obtaining justice
for Sergei Magnitsky and those who have suffered human rights
violations, the Act has just inflamed tensions between two
governments with an already unstable relationship, provoking a backand-forth legislative game to the detriment of both countries. For
example, in the two years since this paper was first drafted, several
major events have occurred that have placed Russia and the United
States directly at odds against each other. First, as mentioned
previously, the Edward Snowden incident occurred,133 followed by
the crisis and debate over intervention in Syria, cancelled bilateral
negotiations, and a scathing op-ed written by Putin.134 Most recently,
a series of aggressions between the two countries erupted over the
crisis in the Ukraine and Russia’s subsequent intervention, ultimately
resulting in a second round of Magnitsky-like sanctions by the United
States on leading Russian figures and institutions.135 These tensions
have yet to lessen.136

133. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
135. Interestingly, William Browder weighed in on the sanctions resulting
from Russia’s intervention in the Ukraine, stating, “This is exactly what the
Magnitsky Act was created for.” Adam Taylor, The Man Behind the Magnitsky Act
Explains Why Now is the Time to Go After the Russian Elite’s Assets, WASH. POST
(Mar. 3, 2014, 7:07 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp
/2014/03/03/the-man-behind-the-magnitsky-act-explains-why-now-is-the-time-togo-after-the-russian-elites-assets/.
136. In fact, U.S. officials are considering adding additional sanctions to those
already in place, due to the Pentagon’s report that a Russian attack aircraft made 12
close passes (within 1,000 yards) near an American destroyer in the Black Sea; a
move considered to be both “provocative and unprofessional.” Peter Baker, With
Ukraine Tensions Mounting, U.S. Weighs New Sanctions Against Russia, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2014, at A8.; Russian Fighter Jet Ignored Warnings and
‘Provocatively’ Passed U.S. Navy Destroyer in Black Sea for 90 Minutes, Getting
as Close as 1,000 Yards, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 14, 2014, 3:47 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2604590/Russian-fighter-jet-ignoredwarnings-provocatively-passed-U-S-Navy-destroyer-Black-Sea-90-minutesgetting-close-1-000-yards.html.
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For these reasons, it would appear that the Magnitsky Act is
more detrimental than beneficial to American foreign relations.
Perhaps it would be better for the U.S. and the international
community to use other mediums through which they can hold Russia
accountable for Magnitsky’s death, such as human rights treaties
Russia has signed and the international court system. In this way, the
United States can seek justice for Sergei Magnitsky, while still
attempting to repair its tenuous relationship with the Russian
Federation.

